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Today, more than ever before, the federal government is in the business of
research and development work. Official estimates place the total funds obligated
in the research and development (R&D) programs undertaken by the various
agencies of the federal government during fiscal year 1963 at almost $i4.7 billion,'
and our newspapers are filled with articles concerning the size and diversity of these
programs.2  However, almost all the comment regarding R&D is addressed to the
direct support of research by the federal government, either through intramural
research undertaken directly by government employees at federal installations, or
through direct support of research by means of government contracts and grants for
R&D. Scant attention has been given to the indirect support of research and develop-
ment through partial reimbursement of a contractor's independent research and
development (IR&D) program. By definition IR&D is a contractor's research and
development which is not sponsored by a government contract or grant,3 but IR&D
may be supported indirectly as an overhead item if the contractor has cost-reimburse-
ment type contracts with the federal government. An example will serve to
illustrate.
Charley Brown Electronics, Inc., as its name implies, is engaged in research,
development, and manufacture of various exotic electronic components which are
utilized by industry and government. In 1963 Brown's commercial sales were $35
million, and its sales on a fixed-price basis to the federal government were $28
million. Brown is also operating under various cost-reimbursement type contracts
in which it incurred direct labor and material costs of $40 million during 1963. In
computing the overhead attributable to these cost-reimbursement contracts, it is
learned that the total overhead costs, excluding IR&D, were $3o million. In addi-
tion, Brown has undertaken on its own initiative, a substantial IR&D program, con-
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sisting of a variety of projects relating to advanced means of communication and the
improvement of several existing communication systems. The total costs of this
IR&D program in 1963 were $20 million. Assuming that the total direct labor
and material costs of the commercial sales and the government fixed-price sales were
$40 million, the overhead and IR&D (if allowable) will be apportioned fifty per cent
to the government cost contracts. Accordingly, the total cost of the cost contracts to
the government will be $65 million ($40 million in direct expenditures plus $io
million in IR&D and $15 million in other overhead). In other words, the government
has paid for half of the IR&D.
At its best, reimbursement of IR&D means that the government initiates and
encourages research and development in innumerable areas and advances science
generally by paying only a fraction of the cost. At its worst, reimbursement of
IR&D means that the government has expended public funds on a program of
purely commercial interest to a particular contractor, a program which would
have been undertaken even without the expenditure of public funds, and a program
which is being duplicated elsewhere by another company working without govern-
ment support. Moreover, there is no assurance that the results of the IR&D, even
though supported in part by public funds, will be made available to the scientific
community generally.
This paper will explore in detail the various policies which have governed the
reimbursement of IR&D from time to time, and will point up certain of the
problem areas. Current efforts to develop government-wide IR&D proposals will
be evaluated, and a few suggestions will be made for the improvement of existing
policies and procedures in order to protect the individual government contractor,
as well as the public at large. The discussion will center upon the Defense Depart-
ment, since this agency is by far the largest government buyer and it continues to
have the largest R&D budget A recent estimate within the Defense Department
places the total cost of IR&D to that agency during 1962 alone at $9oo million.
I
IR&D Ex'ENDiTuRus TO 196o
A. Predetermined Overhead Rates
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) provisions dealing with
the allowability of IR&D have become increasingly sophisticated with time. The
1948 edition of ASPR provided at i5-2o4(s) that research and development costs were
allowable so long as "specifically applicable to the supplies or services covered by
the contract,"5 but section 15-2050) provided that "general research" was unallow-
'The total obligations incurred for research and development and R&D plant by the Defense Depart-
ment during fiscal year x963 were estimated at $7.8 billion, U.S. NA-mONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Fan-
ERAL FUNDS FOR SCIENCE XI, at 2 (1963).
'The applicable text of the section is as follows:
"15-204 Examples of Items of Allowable Costs. Subject to the requirements of paragraph 15-20X with
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able "unless specifically provided for elsewhere in the contract."6  Since general
research, by definition, would almost never be "specifically applicable" to the supplies
or services being purchased under a particular contract, a specific provision else-
where in the contract was necessary to authorize reimbursement. Although applied
research and development might be in a field in which the government had a
definite interest, such costs were not reimbursable unless they were shown to be
specifically applicable to the particular contract under which reimbursement was
sought.
Prior to 1956, however, retroactive reimbursement of research and development
costs was not as serious a problem as it is today. This is because the indirect
costs of a government cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contractor were reimbursed
through negotiated, predetermined overhead rates which were incorporated into the
contract before the costs were incurred. Thus, the matter of general research costs
was taken up before the costs were incurred, and the agreement between the parties
was incorporated in the contract, thereby qualifying under 15-2o5(j)'s requirement
that such costs must be "specifically provided for elsewhere in the contract." This
procedure also assured that the contracting officer would have a voice in the research
undertaken by the contractor if the contractor was to be reimbursed therefor.
However, on January 27, 1956, the Comptroller General ruled that the use of
predetermined overhead rates violated the congressional prohibition against contracts
providing for payment on the basis of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost (CPPC) . In
so holding, the Comptroller General noted that the evils of this system of cost-
reimbursement had been repeatedly discussed-the contractor was encouraged to
increase his profit by carelessly or deliberately increasing his cost at the expense of
the government
B. Postdetermined Overhead Rates
The 1955 edition of ASPR did not change the underlying provisions relative to
"research and development" and to "general research"; ASPR 15-204(s) and i5-2o5(j)
continued the same language used in the 1948 ASPRY However, these provisions
respect to the general basis for determining allowability of costs, and irrespective of whether the par-
ticular costs are treated by the contractor as direct or indirect, the following items of costs are considered
allowable within the limitations indicated:
(s) Research and development specifically applicable to the supplies or services covered by the contract."
SThe text of the section is as follows:
"15-205 Examples of Items of Unallowable Costs. Irrespective of whether the particular costs are treated
by the contractor as direct or indirect, the following items of cost are considered unallowable, except as
indicated:
(j) General research, unless specifically provided for elsewhere in the contract."
B-ia6794, Jan. 27, x956, 35 Dacs. Comi'. GEN. 434 (956).
8 "The evils attributed to this system of contracting have been elaborated on many times. They consist,
essentially, in abetting the temptation and possibility that a contractor may increase his profit by carelessly
or deliberately increasing his cost at the expense of the Government under a reimbursable contract." 35
Dacs. Comp. GEN. 434, at 435.
' See notes 5 and 6, supra.
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were applied in an entirely different atmosphere due to the advent of the revised
method of negotiating overhead rates which was necessitated by the Comptroller
General opinion cited above.
The revised method makes use of postdetermined overhead rates, i.e., rates deter-
mined after the close of the contract period.'0 A provisional overhead rate is
established prior to the contract period for interim billing purposes only," this tenta-
tive rate being based upon the contractor's previous cost experience under the same
or similar contracts. Upon the expiration of the period specified in the contract
schedule, the contractor submits a proposed final overhead rate which reflects the
overhead costs actually incurred during the period. The contractor's proposal is
submitted to the cognizant audit agency for advisory audit, and it is subjected to the
standards of ASPR section fifteen, part two, which have been incorporated into
the contract.' 2 Ultimately, a negotiated final overhead rate is agreed to by the parties,
and this rate is incorporated into the contract. The term "rate" is used even though
the parties are actually dealing with the allowability of particular items as overhead
and then with an apportionment of the overhead, because the parties ultimately
express the allowable overhead as a specific percentage of the direct cost base. Thus
the form of the old predetermined overhead rate is preserved while the result is
quite different.
The result is different first because the postdetermined overhead rate, not being
part of the original contract, does not qualify as a specific provision elsewhere in
the contract, as was required under the pre-i96o ASPR to justify the inclusion of
general research costs in overhead. Secondly, the contracting officer's authority
to bind the government is much more limited at the time he negotiates the post-
determined overhead rate than it was when he negotiated the original contract.
If at the time of negotiating the original contract, the contracting officer agreed
to reimburse general research costs in whole or in part, this would constitute part
of the legal consideration for the contractor's performance. When general research
"For a more complete discussion of the negotiated overhead rates procedure, see ASPR sec. III, Part 7.
See also, PAUL M. TRuEGE, ACCOUNTING GUIDE Poi DEFENSE CONTrAcs cc. 17-19 (4 th ed. x963).
" ASPR 3-7012.
"The Negotiated Overhead Rates clause (Dec. 1956) provided in part as follows:
"(b) The Contractor, as soon as possible but not later than ninety (9o) days after the expiration of
each period specified in the Schedule, shall submit to the Contracting Officer . . . a proposed final over-
head rate or rates for that period based on the Contractor's actual cost experience during that period,
together with supporting cost data. Negotiation of final overhead rates by the Contractor and the Con-
tracting Officer shall be undertaken as promptly as practicable after receipt of the Contractor's proposal.
"(c) Allowability of costs and acceptability of cost allocation methods shall be determined in accord-
ance with ASPR, Section XV, Part 2, as in effect on the date of this contract.
"(d) The results of each negotiation shall be set forth in an amendment to this contract, which
shall specify (i) the agreed final rates, (ii) the bases to which the rates apply, (iii) the periods for which
the rates apply, and (iv) the specific items treated as direct costs or any changes in the items previously
agreed to be direct costs.
"(f) Any failure by the parties to agree on any final rate or rates under this clause shall be considered
a dispute concerning a question of fact for decision by the Contracting Officer within the meaning of
the clause of this contract entitled 'Disputes.'"
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costs are first discussed as part of the final overhead rate negotiations, the contracting
officer's authority is merely to apply the provisions of ASPR, section fifteen, part two,
which have been incorporated into the contract. 13  If there was no provision for
reimbursement of general research in the original contract, an agreement to re-
imburse such costs negotiated after the contract period would appear to be an
amendment without consideration. Such an amendment without consideration
would be beyond the authority of the contracting officer and therefore not binding
on the government. 4
C. Recovery of IR&D Expenditures Under Public Law 85-804
When the revised method of negotiating overhead rates was adopted by the
Department of Defense in 1956, the Negotiated Overhead Rates clause (December
1956) was incorporated into all new contracts without full consideration of the
effect which this would have upon the reimbursement of general research expenses.
Thus, a number of contractors who had previously been reimbursed general research
expenses under a predetermined overhead rate continued their independent research
programs apparently upon the supposition that government reimbursement would
be continued. Upon the expiration of the contract period, the government refused
to reimburse the general research costs because reimbursement was not "specifically
provided for elsewhere in the contract," and the contractors sought relief under the
provisions of Public Law 85-804.'
The contractor has prevailed in a number of these cases before the Army Contract
Adjustment Board, the Navy Contract Adjustment Board, and the Air Force Con-
tract Adjustment Board. In the only one of these cases which has been made
available to the public in printed form, Westinghouse Electric Corp.,6 the Army
Contract Adjustment Board amended the contract terms retroactively in order to
correct a mutual mistake 7 In so doing the Board stated the issue as being whether
the terms of the original contract "express the true intent of Westinghouse and the
United States" as to the allowability of general research. Although the matter had
not been discussed at the time the contracts were executed nor at the time the
Negotiated Overhead Rates clause was incorporated therein, the Board found that
the intent of the parties had been to continue inclusion of general research in over-
head. The Board emphasized the long history of allowing general research to
Westinghouse as part of the predetermined overhead rate, and'it concluded that
had there been any .intent to change this longstanding practice, this would have
been discussed by. the parties. In another recent case, however, recovery has been
" See paragraph (c) of the Negotiated Overhead Rates clause, note 12 supra.
'Ms. Comp. Gen. B-I 5 o 9 9 4 , April 3, 1963. See also B-I25 769, Oc. 24, 1955, 35 DEcs. ComP.
GEN. 23o, at 232 (1955); Steel Improvement & Forge Co., ASBCA No.'7I43, x962 BCA 3597, it
18,136.
'u 72 Stat. 972, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-35 (I958). See also ASPR § 17.
10 ACAB No. zoio, Feb. 14, 1961, reprinted in GEORoG WASHINGTON UNsvmRsnrv, CORRECTION oF
MISTAsEs IN CONTRACTS II (Gov't Cont. Monograph-No. I, 1961).
"
7 See ASPR 17-204.3(i).
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denied where the contractor failed to prove that the government intended to re-
imburse the general research program prior to the costs being incurred.'
Thus it would appear that in those cases meeting the rather rigorous requirements
of Public Law 85-804, the contract adjustment boards will authorize retroactive
amendment of existing contracts to allow reimbursement of general research. It
should be emphasized, however, that the contractor has the burden of proving not
only his own intent, but also the government's intent, prior to the costs being in-
curred, that such costs be reimbursed. This contractor burden of proof is par-
ticularly difficult where the government has not knowingly reimbursed general
research costs over a considerable period of time prior to the year in question.
D. Must An Independent Research Program Be Burdened With Its
Proportionate Share of Overhead and Other Indirect Costs
An additional problem arose in those cases where general research was conceded
to be an unallowable item of overhead-that is, where the contract failed to "spe-
cifically provide" for its reimbursement. Admittedly in these situations the direct
cost of labor and materials expended on the general research program must be
excluded from the reimbursable overhead. But must the direct research cost also be
required to bear a proportionate part of the overhead expenses?" ° An example will
serve to highlight this issue.
Suppose that Corporation A is engaged in research and development exclusively
financed under CPFF government contracts. In addition, the contractor has an
IR&D program relating to a totally new concept in home ice cream freezers which
it hopes to develop commercially at some future time. The direct costs of this
IR&D program (i.e., the direct labor hours and materials) are excluded from con-
tractor's overhead, since this IR&D is not "specifically applicable" to the research
services being supplied under the government contract and reimbursement is not
"specifically provided for elsewhere in the contract."2  Suppose that the direct
labor and material cost of the government contracts was $750,000, while that of
the IR&D program was $250,000. In addition, a research organization of this nature
generates relatively high overhead costs, and Corporation A had overhead costs of
$i,ooo,ooo in the fiscal year involved. If the IR&D program is not burdened with
its proportionate share of overhead, the cost of the government contracts will be
$1,750,000 while the IR&D program will be charged only with its direct cost of
$250,000.
The IR&D program presumably generated certain of the indirect costs such as
electricity, payroll taxes, material handling costs, and the administrative costs of
overseeing the program. It would be virtually impossible to segregate all the
indirect costs thus occasioned; for example, the president of the company could
"
8 Raytheon Co., Navy Contract Adjustment Board, Dec. 8, 1962, aff'd on rehearing, May 1, x9G3.
"gThe problem is discussed at this point because most of the cases arose under the pre-96o ASPR,
but the problem may also arise under the current ASPR in those instances where IR&D is unallowablc.
"0 See notes 5 and 6 supra.
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hardly be expected to maintain a record of the hours which he devoted to thinking
about the IR&D program. Thus, the most practical means of assuring that these
IR&D-generated indirect costs be excluded from the overhead reimbursable under
the government contract is to require that the direct IR&D expenses bear a pro-
portionate part of the overhead. In the example, therefore, the total cost of the
government contracts would be $i,5ooooo, and the IR&D $5oo,ooo.
In a very recent opinion, the Comptroller General has held that where IR&D is
nonallowable, the direct IR&D costs must be burdened with their proportionate share
of indirect expenditures, and both must be disallowed1 Although the circumstances
there presented arose under the pre-i96o ASPR, there is strong dicta in the opinion
which indicates that the Comptroller General would reach the same result under
the current ASPR 2 This opinion also is consistent with two previous Comptroller
General opinions involving advertising expenses, 3 the reimbursement of which has
for many years been curtailed under the ASPR 4 In these previous opinions, the
Comptroller General held that where a certain percentage of the direct cost of
advertising was not reimbursable, the same proportion of the indirect costs-i., the
administrative costs in operating the advertising department-must also be dis-
allowed.
An early opinion of the ASBCA, International Industrial Development Co., Inc.,26
reached the same result. In recent years, however, the ASBCA has reversed the
reasoning of the International case without expressly mentioning that case. In
Tracerlab, Inc.,21 and two cases following it,27 the Board held that while certain
general research costs incurred by the contractor were not specifically applicable to
the work being done under the government contract and therefore were not re-
imbursable, this general research was not required to absorb its proportionate portion
of contractor's overhead. These cases appear to give undue emphasis to the con-
tractor's consistently-applied accounting practice. In a cost-reimbursement type
contract, the contractor's acounting practice is always subject to the general test of
reasonableness, allocability, and generally accepted accounting practices;2" and there
are numerous cases in which the contractor has been required to deviate from his
"Ms. Comp. Gen. B-152462, Jan. 15, 1964.
2' "It is fundamental that the costs of any product or project include direct costs as well as indirect
costs generated by that product or project, and there is nothing in part 2, section XV of ASPR, either prior
or subsequent to revision No. 50, which would even suggest a departure from this basic principle." See
also text accompanying note 32 infra.
"
3 Ms. Comp. Gen. B-i2661i (Feb. 17 1956), Ms. Comp. Gen. B-13865 o (Oct. 21, 1959).
2 See the current coverage in ASPR 15-2o5.1.
2 ASBCA No. 172, June 30, 1950.
2 ASBCA No. 4546, 1959-x BCA 2221.
"Technical Operations, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 5014 and 5031, 1959-2 BCA 2455; National Research
Corp., ASBCA No. 7524, 1962 BCA 3526, at 17,930:
"This board has had occasion to determine in several instances that the direct labor costs of general
research are not properly included in the denominator base of this ratio [for apportioning overhead to the
government contract] when the contractor's normal accounting practice is to include its general research
costs in overhead expense [citing cases]."
2' See ASPR 15-2Or.2.
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normal accounting system in order to reflect more accurately the true cost of his
government contracts29 Moreover, the underlying reason for having section fifteen
of ASPR at all would appear to be that consistently applied accounting principles
are not sufficient to protect the government's interest.
The Tracerlab opinion also lays considerable emphasis upon the argument that
since IR&D is itself an indirect or overhead expense, it should not be required to bear
its share of other indirect expenses. This reasoning overlooks the fact that the terms
"direct" and "indirect" are relative terms, depending upon the level at which they
are used. While it is true that general research is an indirect expense in the sense
that it is normally apportioned among the various production divisions, this is
because the cost accountant is normally interested in the total cost of the various
production divisions. If a general research division were created and the accountant
were interested in determining the total cost of this general research division, it
would be necessary that the division bear a proportionate part of the indirect costs
of other staff divisions30 Moreover, when a contractor undertakes an R&D contract
on a cost-reimbursement basis for the government, this contract is required to bear
its proportionate part of the overhead and administrative costs of contractor's
operations.
Prior to 1959, ASPR did not expressly deal with this problem; but in that year
the ASPR was amended to provide that IR&D would include its appropriate share
of indirect and administrative costs "unless the contractor, in accordance with his
accounting practices consistently applied, treats such costs otherwise."3 1  Un-
fortunately, this provision probably poses more questions than it answers. In the
first place, the phrase "accounting practices consistently applied" is nowhere defined.
Has the contractor complied therewith by applying a consistent practice throughout
his entire organization for a single year or, as is more likely, must a history of this
accounting practice be shown? A literal interpretation of the "unless" clause
would also work an injustice upon those contractors who previously had accepted
the government's practice of burdening IR&D since they would now be bound
thereby, while those contractors who had refused to do so would be protected by
their contrary but consistently applied practice.
The preferable interpretation of the "unless" clause set forth above would appear
to be that it is subject to the general limitations on allowability applicable to all
contractor costs--reasonableness, allocability, and conformance with generally
accepted accounting practices. 2 In other words, the clause does not mean that an
20 Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., ASBCA No. 6468, ig6x-2 BCA 3126; Plasmadyne Corp., ASBCA
No. 7731, 1962 BCA 3452, at 17,684:
"While under the decision of this Board a contractor is usually held to the method of allocating overhead
previously followed, when it is demonstrated that such method results in an unreasonable price and it iq
demonstrated that a different method produces a reasonable price, then the method originally utilized
must be abandoned."
" See Cost ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 133-34 (T. Lang ed. 1947). See also TnuEoaR, op. cit. supra
note io, at 266-67.31ASPR 15-205.35(f).
"
2 See ASPR 15-201.2.
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incorrect method is rendered acceptable by its consistent use, but rather that a
contractor will not be required drastically to alter his accounting methods if he follows
some other method which effectively segregates the IR&D costs, both direct and
indirect, from the government contract costs.
II
IR&D EXPENDITURES SINCE 196o
In late 1959 the cost principles of ASPR were extensively revised and the present
principles relating to IR&D were prescribed. 3 The revised principles were required
to be incorporated into all cost-reimbursement type contracts executed after July i,
I96o.' An interesting case arose concerning a government contractor whose con-
tracts incorporated the pre-i96o ASPR, but who sought to take advantage of the
liberalized IR&D provisions after the change. 3  The contractor argued that para-
graph (c) of the Negotiated Overhead Rates clause36 did not incorporate the ASPR
as in effect on a certain date, but rather applied any version of ASPR in effect at
any pertinent time during the contract performance period. Specifically rejecting
this contention, the ASBCA noted that ASPR is subject to unilateral change on
the part of the government, and if the contractor's contentions were valid, the pro-
vision incorporating current ASPR cost principles would be an illusory stipulation
establishing nothing of any fixed significance.
A. Present ASPR Treatment of IR&D
The 1959 change first introduced the phrase "independent research and develop-
ment" into the ASPR. It also defined for the first time "basic research," "applied
research," and "development," although it was apparent from the beginning that
there were no clear-cut dividing lines between the three. Basic or so-called "blue
sky" research is defined as the increasing of knowledge in science generally, but not
any practical application thereof. Applied research ordinarily follows basic research
and attempts to advance the state of the arts, still without attempting to develop any
specific articles or services to be offered for sale.aT Development is the systematic
use of scientific knowledge directed toward the production or improvement of "use-
ful products to meet specific performance requirements."38
The new principles undoubtedly were intended to liberalize as well as clarify, and
independent research is broadly stated to be an allowable cost so long as it is allocated
to all work of the contractor.39 This rather broad language of allowability is how-
"ASPR 15-2o5.35 as promulgated in Change 50 to the 1955 ASPR, dated Nov. 2, I959.
"See the instructions accompanying Change 50. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense
to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, dated February io, x96o, provided that existing
contracts would continue to be governed by the cost principles incorporated therein.
General Analysis Corp., ASBCA No. 6920, 1962 BCA 3337.
'o See note 12 supra.
'r ASPR 15-205.35(a).
'" ASPR 15-20 5 .3 5 (b).2 ASPR I5-205.35(d).
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ever qualified by three tests contained in ASPR i 5-2o5.35(h): the expenditures must
be reasonable; they must be part of a broad, well-managed, and planned program;
and the expenditures should be scrutinized with great care in connection with
contractors whose work is predominantly or substantially with the government.
Allowability of independent development is more restrictive than that of in-
dependent research. In addition to the restrictions of i5-2o5.35 (h), independent
development must be related to the product lines for which the government has
contracts and allocated as an indirect cost to all work of the contractor on all
product lines related to the independent development.40 A more liberal test of
allowability for independent development is prescribed where the contractor's normal
course of business does not involve production work-a provision evidently intended
to apply to those contractors whose end output is research. In such cases, independ-
ent development is allowable to the extent that it is related and allocated as an
indirect cost "to the field of effort of government research and development con-
tracts."'" This provision is rather ambiguous, but should also be read as requiring
that the independent development costs be allocated to all work of the contractor
which is related thereto.
In addition, under the current ASPR, numerous costs closely related to IR&D
are being reimbursed as "bidding costs." ASPR i5-2o5.3 provides that the costs of
preparing bids or proposals on potential government and nongovernment con-
tracts, including the development of engineering and cost data, are allowable as
indirect costs. Thus a contractor who receives a complicated request for proposals
and is given five months for compiling his data and submitting his proposal
would incur heavy expenditures in preparing such proposal; and much of the
technical preparation would involve expenditures little different from the costs in-
curred in an IR&D program. Such costs would be an allowable item of overhead in
the year incurred (and therefore chargeable pro rata to any government contracts
then in existence), whether or not the individual contractor was successful in securing
the contract and whether or not his proposal was submitted in answer to a govern-
ment solicitation. In effect, the contractor is encouraged to classify these costs as
bidding costs rather than IR&D since the latter are often subject to various cost-
sharing arrangements.
B. Capitalization of IR&D Expenditures
IR&D expenditures normally are charged as a cost of doing business in the year
incurred and are prorated as an item of overhead to the contractor's various product
lines in that year. This usually would be to the contractor's benefit from both a
federal income tax standpoint (since his net income and therefore his tax would be
"o ASPR 15-205.35(e). Although the ASPR wording is not entirely clear, the intent appears to be
that the independent development expenses be allocated to all related product lines, and not merely
to those related product lines for which the government has contracts.
"ASPR 15-205.35(e). (Emphasis added.)
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lower) 'and from a government contract standpoint (since the reimbursement would
be in the same year in which the expenditures were incurred).
There are a number of cases, however, which have allowed the contractor to
capitalize such costs and to charge them off in subsequent years. In one of the
earliest cases, for example, the contractor was allowed to charge pre-contract research
and development costs against a subsequent cost-plus-fixed-fee production contract.42
In a more recent case, the contractor in performing certain fixed-price R&D contracts
incurred costs substantially in excess of the contract price. These excess costs
were charged to a general and administrative expense account entitled "Amortization
of Patent Rights" and were written off over a five-year period. The ASBCA held
that such costs were properly chargeable against subsequent CPFF government
contracts as "research and development costs specifically applicable" to the con-
tracts43 under the pre-i96o ASPR i5-2o4(s). 4  Of course, where the IR&D costs
have been charged to overhead which has been allocably charged to previous govern-
ment contracts, the costs may not be reimbursed a second time under a subsequent
production contract.45 There is also a line of price redetermination cases which
have disallowed the amortization of R&D expenditures 6
The only express consideration of this problem in the current ASPR is a rather
perplexing provision that research and development costs (whether or not capitalized)
which were incurred in accounting periods prior to the award of a particular contract
are unallowable except where allowable as precontract costs.47 Since IR&D costs
normally would not qualify under the narrow definition of precontract costss48 the
effect of this provision appears to be that where a contractor capitalizes his IR&D
expenses and then amortizes them over a period of years, new contracts must bear
no portion of the IR&D costs which were incurred prior to the award of the contract.
If this provision were strictly applied, it would require that the overhead amortiza-
tion be computed separately for each new contract,4 9 a procedure which apparently is
not now being followed, probably because few contractors amortize their IR&D
costs. Moreover, the cited provision applies only to costs incurred prior to the
award of a particular contract, and does not address itself to costs incurred sub-
sequent to award but prior to the current fiscal year. The provision would be more
workable if it excluded all IR&D costs incurred prior to the contractor's current
fiscal year.
1 Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, Ioo F. Supp. 661 (Ct. Cl. i9pr), aff'd per cutiam, 344 U.S.
86o (1952). The holding is not as clear as it might be since much of the Court' of Claims' opinion
was directed to the issue of whether or not the government was bound by the contracting officer's decision
to allow the costs.
'3 Kellett Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 5658, xg6o-i BCA 2584.
"See note 5 stupra.
";S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., Inc., ASBCA 4012, ig6o-i BCA 2588.
"'Polytechnic Research & Development Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 1995, Oct. 13, 1954; Gar Wood In-
dustries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 2327 and 2329, March 30, 1956; and Audio Products Corp., ASBCA No.
269o, 1957-1 BCA' 1289.
IT ASPR 15-205.35(g).
"See ASPR 15-2o5.3o.
"See TRtuEor, op. cit. supra note 1o, at 133.
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There are a number of instances in which precontract research and development
costs should be allowable against subsequent government contracts even though the
costs fail to qualify as "precontract costs" under ASPR I5-205.3o. For example, if
a commercial contractor develops through his own independent efforts a product
which is subsequently sold to the government, and if these development costs have
not been previously included in the overhead which was allocated in part to govern-
ment contracts, the government should pay its allocable share of these development
costs as one of the components of the price it pays for the product. If the product
is sold under a cost-reimbursement type contract, an allocable share of the precontract
developmental costs should be allowable as direct costs." In any case, the preferable
method of dealing with such costs would be as part of the precontract negotiations.
C. Advance Agreements
As has been indicated above, the present ASPR provisions relating to the allow-
ability of IR&D expenditures give rise to a number of unresolved problem areas, not
the least of which is distinguishing independent research from independent develop-
ment. Thus, the contractor who undertakes an IR&D program cannot be sure
whether any portion of that program will be reimbursable under his government
contracts; and to a great extent he assumes the risk that the costs subsequently will
be determined nonallowable. In order to alleviate this hardship, the ASPR provides
a procedure whereby an advance understanding may be negotiated between the
parties as to the allowability of IR&D costs.' A recent case indicates that, for a
valid advance agreement, there must be both (i) an advance understanding (prior
to the costs being incurred) and (2) its incorporation into the contract."2 Although
not all cases have imposed such rigorous formal requirements, " counsel for both
the government and the contractor are well advised to assure that any such agree-
ment be explicit and in writing.
The IR&D reimbursement section indicates that advance agreements are particular-
ly important in those situations where the contractor's work is predominantly or sub-
stantially with the government. 4 This has been administratively determined to
apply to those contractors whose work is fifty per cent or more with the government,
and in the past almost all advance agreements have been negotiated with such con-
tractors. The same section of ASPR also indicates that in some cases it may be
desirable for the government to bear less than an allocable portion of the cost of the
"See ASPR 15-202.
5 1 ASPR r5-205.35(h) and 5-107(v).
"' National Research Corp., ASBCA No. 7524, 1962 BCA 3526.
" There are a number of cases which have held the government bound by various types of advance
understandings, sometimes even when not in writing. See, e.g., H. A. Ely Publications, Inc., ASBCA
49,52, 1959-1 BCA 2102; General Dynamics/Astronautics, ASBCA 6899, 8962 BCA 3391; Spaco
Manufacturing Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 6402, 8968-r BCA 3020. A far different result is reached where
the contracting officer initially expressed disapproval of the proposed expenditure. General Dynamics/
Astronautics Corp., ASBCA No. 765o, 1963 BCA 3685.
".ASPR I5-205.35(h).
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IR&D program. In these cases, the advance agreement may limit the government's
participation by agreement to support certain of the contractor's IR&D projects but
not all of them, by agreement that the government will allocably support the research
to a maximum dollar limitation, or by agreement that the government will accept its
allocable share of only a certain percentage of the contractor's IR&D. This latter
method of cost limitation, the frequently criticized cost-sharing agreement, has been
used almost exclusively.
In summary, it may be said that the advance agreement procedure offers advan-
tages to both parties: the contractor knows in advance whether the government will
accept his IR&D program, and the government may specify in advance those projects
which it is willing to underwrite. Where the government's contribution is to be
limited, however, either of the other two methods of limitation would appear to be
preferable to the arbitrary cost-sharing formula.
D. Negotiation of Independent Research and Development Expenditures
Where More Than One Military Department Is Involved
An individual government contractor may have contracts with more than one
military department, and it would be inefficient and costly to require that he negoti-
ate the overhead rate, or specific items such as IR&D, separately with each depart-
ment. For this reason, the Defense Department has provided an orderly procedure
whereby an individual service is designated to negotiate the allowability of IR&D
for all three services.55 The military services are required to conduct such joint
negotiations in all cases where IR&D costs are substantial, where a substantial portion
of the contractor's business is with the Defense Department, and where the con-
tractor's defense work involves contracts with more than one military department.!6
Since highly specialized and technical considerations must be weighed in evalu-
ating a contractor's IR&D program, the Defense Department has also established
the Armed Services Research Specialists Committee which the sponsoring military
department may call upon for assistance in IR&D negotiations. The Committee is
composed of four experts in the field of research and development, one from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and one each from the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. Its activities are to review the contractor's IR&D program to determine
whether there has been an adequate segregation between independent research and
independent development by the contractor, and to make recommendations to the
sponsoring department "on the scientific and technical factors affecting the basis or
extent to which such programs should be supported. '5 7 Unfortunately, the Commit-
tee has not been widely utilized in the past; and even where used, it has done little
more than review the brochures submitted by contractors to determine whether an
adequate segregation has been made between independent research and independent
development.
" Department of Defense Directive 405.52, June 28, ig6o.
Id. t IN.A.
"i1d. N.A.
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PRoPosED GOVERNMENT-WmE IR&D REGULATIONS
Under the authority of the same presidential letter which initiated the Bell
Report,5" the Bureau of the Budget has instituted a government-wide effort to achieve
uniformity in the contract cost principles applied by the various executive agencies.
To date, much of this effort has centered upon the differing cost principles applied
toward a contractor's IR&D program, the Budget Bureau seeking uniformity of
treatment by the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) P
The Budget Bureau study has indicated that in the immediate past, NASA and
AEC have been more restrictive in allowing reimbursement of IR&D than has the
Defense Department. NASA, for example, will not reimburse IR&D expenditures
under a research contract placed with a commercial organization in response to an
unsolicited proposal." The AEC cost principles, like the pre-i96o ASPR, provide
that independent research and development costs are unallowable unless specifically
provided for elsewhere in the contract. In order to secure an express provision
for reimbursement elsewhere in the contract, the contractor must show that the
IR&D costs provide a benefit to the particular AEC contract for which such
provision is sought. The AEC cost principles also require that IR&D costs shall
include an amount for absorption of their appropriate share of related indirect and
administrative costs.61
As a result of the Budget Bureau study, representatives of Defense, AEC, and
NASA have developed proposed government-wide IR&D cost regulations, which
were mailed to industry for comment in November, 1963. Pertinent parts of these
proposed regulations are reproduced in the Appendix at the end of this article, the
numbering being keyed to existing paragraphs of ASPR. Initial industry comment
indicates a good deal of opposition to the proposed regulations, industry spokesmen
having interpreted various provisions as being more restrictive of allowability than
the present ASPR. For these reasons, it will probably be a number of months before
final regulations are agreed upon and promulgated by the various procuring agencies.
A number of significant changes would be made in the present ASPR by the
proposed regulations. The separate definitions of "basic research," "applied re-
search," and "development" would be dropped, and IR&D broadly defined to en-
compass all unsponsored costs of scientific and technical work, other than manu-
58 U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and
Development, S. Doc. No. 94, 87 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
" The primogenitor of the present inquiry within the Defense Department was a letter from the
Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, to the Secretary of Defense, dated Jan. 22, 1962. Even before the
Budget Bureau letter, however, revision of certain areas of IR&D coverage had been suggested to the ASPR
Committee,
" Letter from Director of Administration, NASA, to Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, Dec. 6,
I96r.
" Letter from Deputy General Manager, AEC, to Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, Dec. 1, x961.
See also AEC PR 9-I5.50Io-I2.
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facturing and production engineering costsO2 As a corollary, scientific and engineer-
ing work leading to the submission of a bid or proposal or to the award of a contract
is specifically defined as being within IR&D. The "bidding costs" section of the
proposed ASPR is restricted to administrative costs such as physically preparing and
submitting technical proposals and cost data.'
While these definitional changes may facilitate administration of the IR&D
section, since virtually all independent scientific and technical effort will be treated
thereunder, this approach also has disadvantages. Since all IR&D will be classed in
a single category, it will be difficult to encourage a particular type of IR&D, such as
basic research, for example. Moreover, IR&D costs are usually subjected to a cost
ceiling, and there are certain costs included within the proposed definition of IR&D
which probably should not be subjected to such a ceiling. Notable among these is
the cost of technical and scientific work undertaken in direct response to a govern-
ment solicitation; such costs should be properly includable in overhead whether or
not a contract ultimately results irom the work.
There is a definite improvement made in requiring that IR&D be required to bear
its proportionate part of overhead expenditures.6 4 By this requirement, the amounts
stated as being IR&D will be more meaningful, and the government will be enabled
to evaluate the program in terms of its total cost.
Improvements are also made in the area of advance agreementsO5 Such agree-
ments are encouraged not only with respect to contractors whose work is "pre-
dominantly or substantially with the government,"66 as is true under the present
ASPR, but also in those cases where "reasonableness or allocability are difficult to
determine." It is to be hoped that this new language will encourage greater use of
the advance agreement, with corresponding greater predictability of the allowability
of IR&D prior to the costs being incurred. In addition, the use of arbitrary,
percentage cost-sharing arrangements will no longer be sanctioned in IR&D advance
agreements. Once it is determined that the program itself is allowable, the govern-
ment will agree to absorb its allocable portion of such program up to a maximum
dollar limitation. Thus, the advance negotiations will dwell upon three factors:
whether the program itself is allowable, what is a reasonable maximum dollar
limitation, and what are the proper bases for allocation?
In determining whether a particular cost is or is not allowable, the proposed cost
principles have abolished the differing standards for independent research and in-
dependent development; but there is still a great lack of predictability in the area
of IR&D reimbursement. An effort is made to test IR&D against the same general
" Manufacturing and production engineering costs will continue to be governed by the provisions
of ASPR 15-205.2X.
"' See Proposed ASPR X5-205.3, Appendix A, infra.
" Proposed ASPR 15-205.35(e). See also text accompanying notes 19-32 supra.
" Proposed ASPR 15-205. 3 5(f).
"
2 Under the present ASPR, this was informally interpreted by the Military Departments to mean
those contractors having 5o% or more of their business with the government
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standards applied to other costs, and IR&D is stated to be allowable if reasonable with-
in the criteria of ASPR i5-2oi.3 and appropriately allocated under ASPR I5-2oi.4.07
In view of the unique nature of IR&D, however, such general standards have little
meaning; and additional standards imposed by the proposed IR&D section itself add
little to the definition's specificity.6 s
Proposed ASPR 15 -2o5 .3 5 (d) does provide that reasonableness is to be deter-
mined by comparing the cost of contractor's IR&D program with the cost of IR&D
programs undertaken throughout the industry, but industry spokesmen have criti-
cized this provision as requiring a meaningless comparison. Moreover, the provision
ignores the most significant comparison: a comparison of the contractor's IR&D pro-
gram with the R&D desired by the government and the total government funds
available for support of R&D.
As regards the allocation of IR&D, the proposed regulations provide that within
the standards of ASPR 15-203, IR&D costs may be distributed throughout the con-
tractor's operations, or only to a particular division, department, plant, group of
plants, or a product line.69 This provision overlooks the fact that a truly equitable
allocation of costs sometimes requires piercing the corporate entity. For example,
at present numerous large corporations have created wholly-owned subsidiaries which
are engaged virtually IOO per cent in R&D under government cost-reimbursement
contracts. Since the parent corporation invariably shares in the technological ad-
vancements of the subsidiary, it would not be unreasonable to require the parent
to bear a portion of the subsidiary's costs, particularly in the area of IR&D-where
the government has no proprietary interest in the results produced, although the
government in effect supports the IR&D almost ioo per cent. Under the present
ASPR, this would be remedied by a cost-sharing agreement whereby only a certain
percentage of IR&D would be allowed as an item of overhead; but since these agree-
ments are no longer to be authorized under the proposed ASPR, some other means
must be found to allocate equitably the IR&D costs of these wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries.
Costs of substantial activity to exploit new business opportunities outside of the
contractor's existing organization and product lines are stated to be unallowable.7 °
This provision evidently was intended to codify such cases as The Martin Co., where-
in the training and educational costs of developing a nuclear division in contractor's
existing aircraft operations was held not to be a reimbursable item of overhead.71
The section should not be interpreted to exclude the costs of research on projects
related to the contractor's operations, but not presently in the form of a salable
product.
'7 Proposed ASPR 15-205.35(b).
" Proposed ASPR 15 -205.35(d).
" Proposed ASPR I5-205.35(e).
7 0 Ibid.
71 ASBCA Nos. 5825, 6oo8, 6x88, i96r-x BCA t 3 0 80 .
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CONCLUSIONS
A. Integration of IR&D Into the Total Complex of Government Support
for Research and Development
The wisdom of government support for IR&D through the overhead rate must be
considered in the context of alternative means of government encouragement and
support of R&D. The income tax laws, for example, provide that subject to certain
limitations, a taxpayer may elect to deduct research and experimental expenditures
in the year incurred, to treat them as deferred expenses which may be amortized
over a period of five years or more, or to capitalize them.72 In one respect these tax
benefits are more meaningful than IR&D reimbursement since the tax benefits are
available to any commercial organization which engages in qualified R&D, while
IR&D reimbursement is available only to those contractors having government cost-
reimbursement type contracts. The new price negotiation policies of ASPR also
provide that a contractor's profit may be higher if his record of past performance is
favorable in the matter of contractor-initiated and financed research and develop-
mental contribution.73 Presumably, such IR&D would not justify increased profits
in subsequent years if the cost thereof had been primarily assumed by the govern-
ment in the overhead rate of previous cost-reimbursement type contracts.
Where direct government support of R&D is desired, several different means are
available. Government laboratories and other installations may be operated with
federal employees, or government-owned facilities may be operated by private con-
tractors. Direct R&D contracts may also be placed with commercial or nonprofit
organizations. 4 Finally, there is the legislation which authorizes basic research
grants to nonprofit institutions of higher education or to nonprofit organizations
whose primary purpose is the conduct of scientific research.75 A properly admin-
istered program of IR&D reimbursement through the overhead rate must be evalu-
ated in conjunction with these alternative means of government support for R&D
and must be integrated therewith.
B. Increasing and More Effective Use of Advance Agreements
In the past, IR&D reimbursement has been too often merely a question for the
auditors, arising after the costs have been incurred and as a part of negotiating the
postdetermined overhead rate. IR&D reimbursement should be negotiated by pro-
curement and technical personnel prior to the contract period through increasing
use of the advance agreement. Such advance agreements should be utilized in all
"J 'Ir. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 174.
"' See ASPR 3-808.5(d) (7).
"'See Exec. Order No. 10521, § 4, I9 Fed. Reg. 1499 (1954). See also Department of Defense
Directive 3210.1, Oct. 26, 1961. For a discussion of the various legal problems arising in R&D procure-
ment, see FEDERAL BAR Ass'N, REsEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROCUREMENT LAw (Lazure & Murphy ed.
1957); FnDERL PUBUCATIONS INC., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACING (1963).
7 72 Stat. 1793, 42 U.S.C. § 1891 (958). See also Department of Defense Directive 3210.2,
Nov. 19, 1962; Whelan, Public Law 85-934: New Federal Support for Basic Scientific Research, 8 J.
Pun. L. 462 (1959).
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circumstances where the contractor's IR&D program is substantial and where he
has sufficient cost-reimbursement type contracts to justify the cost. If it is thought
that such widespread use of the advance agreement will impose an undue burden
upon present government personnel, such agreements may be negotiated for a
period of more than one year. The advance agreement should indicate those
projects which the government is willing to reimburse pro rata through the over-
head rate, as well as the maximum dollar amount of the government's contribution
in a given year. Projects of primarily commercial application should be excluded.
Once such an agreement has been executed, the auditor's role should merely be to
assure that it has been implemented through acceptable accounting principles and
procedures.
Government procedures must be streamlined to assure rapid negotiation of such
advance agreements prior to the contract period. The traditional brochure de-
scribing the R&D to be undertaken and the facilities to be utilized need not be as
exhaustive as has been the case in the past. A summary of the IR&D program,
divided into specific projects, should be sufficient if supplemented by visits of
government technical and procurement personnel to the contractor's plant. At the
end of each year or other agreed period, the contractor should be required to furnish
a summary evaluating the IR&D undertaken and the results achieved. The admin-
istrative costs of preparing both the preliminary brochure (whether or not the govern-
ment accepts the proposed IR&D) and the year-end evaluated results should be
allowable as overhead under any government cost-reimbursement contracts in effect
in the year such costs are incurred.
Where it is desired to limit the government's contribution to a contractor's IR&D
program, this should be done by supporting some, but not all, of the proposed
projects, or by imposing a realistic dollar ceiling on the total amount of IR&D which
will be reimbursed to a particular contractor as an item of overhead in a given year.
As the proposed government-wide IR&D principles have recognized, the use of arbi-
trary, percentage cost-sharing arrangements should be abolished. IR&D, by the very
nature of its inclusion within the overhead rate, is already subject to a cost-sharing
formula depending upon the percentage of contractor's costs which are incurred
under government cost-type contracts as compared to the costs incurred under other
contracts.
C. Meaningful Standards for the Allowance of IR&D
Advance agreements can never be the total answer in assuring predictability in
the area of IR&D reimbursement. This is so because there are numerous contractors
whose IR&D program is so small, or who have so few cost-reimbursement type
government contracts, that the cost involved in negotiation of a detailed advance
agreement is not justified. Meaningful criteria must be promulgated in the various
procurement regulations so that such a contractor, when he undertakes a legitimate
IR&D program, will have some assurance that the program will be an allowable
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item of overhead. Of course, programs which are of primarily commercial applica-
tion should be excluded.
Moreover, even as regards those contractors whose IR&D programs will be subject
to advance agreements, meaningful regulations need to be promulgated in order
to guide the government personnel who will negotiate the advance agreement.
As to such contractors, considerably closer scrutiny will be required than for those
contractors described in the previous paragraph. Perhaps a set of more detailed
regulations should be promulgated exclusively for those contractors whose work is
fifty per cent or more with the federal government.
In summary, it appears that there is a need for a searching inquiry into the
area of IR&D reimbursement for the purposes of integrating IR&D into the total
program of government support for research and development, revising govern-
mental practices and procedures in order to make more effective use of the advance
agreement, and promulgating meaningful standards to govern the allowability of
IR&D expenditures. This need is not adequately being met by the Budget Bureau
study or the proposed regulations recently mailed to industry for comment. If
properly managed, integrated with the various direct means of support for R&D,
and subjected to meaningful standards of allowability, however, reimbursement of
IR&D through the overhead rate would appear to be a desirable method of govern-
ment support for research and development, since the nation as a whole secures more
than a dollar's worth of R&D for each government dollar expended.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED ASPR CHANGES RELATING TO INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS
(As Mailed to Industry in November 1963)
"Revise 15-205.3 to read:
c15-2o5.3 Bidding Costs.
"(a) Bidding costs are limited to the administrative costs involved in preparing
and submitting solicited and nonsolicited bids or proposals to customers (Government
and non-Government) on proposed or potential contracts. Bidding costs include the
cost of the physical preparation and publication of the technical proposal documents
and also the cost of the preparation and publication of cost and such other admin-
istrative data as are necessary to support the contractor's bids or proposals.
"(b) Costs of independent research and development (including scientific and
engineering work which is not sponsored by a contract, grant or other arrangement)
as defined in i5-2o5.35(a) are not allowable as bidding costs.
"(c) Bidding costs for both successful and unsucessful bids normally will be
treated as allowable indirect costs, provided the principles of I5-2oI4 and i5-2o3 are
observed.
"Revise i5-2o5.35 to read:
"15-205.35 Independent Research and Development Costs.
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"(a) A contractor's independent research and development costs are the costs of
scientific and technical work, under whatever name, (except manufacturing and
production engineering costs, described in 15-205.2I) which is not sponsored by a
contract, grant, or other arrangement. Such work includes the scientific and
engineering work leading to the submission of a bid or proposal or to the award of
a contract (see i5-2o5.3).
"(b) A contractor's independent research and development costs are allowable as
indirect costs (see 15-203) to the extent that they are (i) reasonable (see 15-2o.3 and
(d) below), and (ii) appropriately allocated (see 15-201.4 and (e) below).
"(c) Research and development costs (including amounts capitalized), regardless
of their nature, which are incurred in accounting periods prior to the award of a par-
ticular contract, are unallowable.
"(d) The reasonableness of a contractor's research and development costs will
be determined on the basis of all pertinent considerations (see 15-201.3) including
the nature, results, and costs of previous activity, and the soundness of its manage-
ment. Where appropriate, the reasonableness of a contractor's independent research
and development costs will be determined on the basis of evaluations, industry-to-
industry variations in such costs, and independent research and development cost
norms characteristic of industries. Attention will be given to an appraisal of the
quality of (i) a contractor's technical objectives which generate independent research
and development, (ii) his technical and other planning activities to meet these
objectives, (iii) his technical performance in relation to these plans, and (iv) his
utilization of technical results, within his operations, all in comparison with those of
other contractors.
"(e) A contractor's independent research and development costs will be distrib-
uted in accordance with the principles provided by 15-2o3. This may point to a con-
tractor-wide distribution or to distribution only to a particular division, department,
plant, group of products, or a product line. The full direct and indirect costs (engi-
neering and laboratory overhead, manufacturing overhead, and general and admin-
istrative expenses) of independent research and development projects shall be deter-
mined prior to allocation. The costs of substantial activity, conducted by a con-
tractor to exploit new business opportunities and for which the contractor's existing
organization and product lines do not permit reasonable or proper allocation, will be
regarded as unallowable.
"(f) Advance agreements as described in 15-107 are particularly important with
respect to contractors whose work is predominandy or substantially with the govern-
ment or in those cases where reasonableness or allocability are difficult to determine.
Where this procedure is used, the contractor's proposed independent research and
development costs will be evaluated as to allowability (see (b) above) and, based on
such evaluation, agreement will be reached on a maximum dollar limitation repre-
senting a reasonable independent research and development program and on the
bases for its allocation."
